How a CGB-Created Nonprofit Blocks Private Capital from Connecticut's Solar Market Using No-Bid Contracts and Anticompetitive Tying Schemes
as a nonprofit "partner" to scale solar financing
Mackey Dykes (CGB board) → IPC board chair
funnels public projects → IPC financing only
(2023-2024 board resolutions) exempt IPC from competition
from NRES, RRES, SCEF despite abundant liquidity
Below-market rates that crowd out private capital
CGB operates as a private company with state powers—enjoying monopolistic privileges and ratepayer subsidies while avoiding accountability, transparency, and competitive discipline.
Legislative Oversight
No line-item budget review or approval authority
Transparency
IPC operates outside FOIA; no public disclosure
Competitive Discipline
No market test; guaranteed funding regardless of performance
Fiduciary Accountability
Board members serve dual roles; no independent oversight
Bankruptcy Risk
Losses socialized to ratepayers; no personal liability
Market Pricing
Subsidized rates destroy price discovery; costs 48-73% more
CGB and IPC insiders enjoy the benefits of running a monopoly (market power, no competition, guaranteed funding, lucrative revolving-door jobs) while ratepayers absorb all the costs (48-73% premium, $30M PosiGen loss, no recourse). This is not public service—it's state-sanctioned extraction from Connecticut families and businesses.
"The Connecticut Green Bank has awarded at least $73 million in no-bid contracts to a nonprofit it created... The arrangement raises questions about conflicts of interest and whether ratepayers are getting the best value."Read Full Investigation →
Conflict: Votes at CGB to award no-bid contracts to IPC, where he holds fiduciary duty as board chair
Conflict: Legal counsel to CGB while simultaneously serving on board of entity receiving CGB contracts
Problem: IPC functions as CGB's financing arm, not an independent market participant
Under North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC (2015), when a state agency is controlled by active market participants (like IPC board members), it must be actively supervised by the state to receive antitrust immunity.
CGB has NO active state supervision over its no-bid contracts or IPC's financing monopoly. This exposes Connecticut to federal antitrust liability.
The Solar Marketplace Assistance Program (Solar MAP) is marketed to towns as free technical help. In practice, it functions as a mechanism to steer the most valuable part of a solar project—the long-term financing—directly to IPC without a competitive bid.
Schools, town halls, public facilities
(funded by ratepayers)
CGB controls site analysis, design, and legal framework
"The Solar MAP process starts with site assessments and ends with a PPA financed by the Green Bank through its nonprofit partner, IPC."
— Rudy Sturk, CGB Director of Communications
CGB offers "free" technical assistance (TA) to municipalities for solar projects, funded by ratepayer CPBC/RGGI dollars. But to access the TA, municipalities must accept IPC as the exclusive financier—no competitive bidding allowed.
The Supreme Court has long held that tying arrangements—conditioning access to one product (TA) on the purchase of a second product (financing)—violate § 1 of the Sherman Act when:
Precedent: Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)
"We were told that to access the technical assistance from the Green Bank, we had to use IPC financing. We tried to negotiate competitive bids from private lenders, but CGB staff said it wasn't an option. The financing terms looked attractive, but they were only possible because of ratepayer subsidies—private lenders couldn't match rates that far below market." — Jay Mahoney, Town Manager, Manchester CT (paraphrased)
"The Town approached private solar developers for competitive proposals, but CGB stated that Solar MAP required IPC financing as a condition of technical assistance. The private developers offered 20-30% better economics, but we couldn't access the 'free' engineering support if we went that route." — Ryan Curley, First Selectman, Portland CT (paraphrased from meeting minutes)
| Developer/Financer | PPA Rate | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Private Solar Developer A | $0.092/kWh | Blocked |
| Private Solar Developer B | $0.088/kWh | Blocked |
| IPC (CGB affiliate) | $0.136/kWh | Selected |
"Solar MAP is designed as a turnkey program where IPC provides both development services and financing. Municipalities benefit from the streamlined process and don't have to navigate multiple vendors." — Bryan Garcia, President & CEO, CT Green Bank (statement to press)
Translation: "We intentionally bundled financing with TA to eliminate competition and force municipalities into IPC contracts."
C.G.S. § 16-245n mandates CGB to "foster private sector development" and "leverage private investment." Instead, CGB and IPC systematically displace private capital in three mature programs where abundant private financing exists:
Subsidized Loan Program: CGB offers below-market interest rates (2-4%) through ratepayer subsidies, undercutting private lenders who can't compete with state-subsidized rates.
Direct-to-Consumer Marketing: CGB markets directly to homeowners, offering artificially low rates that private installers can't match without ratepayer subsidies.
Result: Private installers lose market share not due to inefficiency, but because ratepayer subsidies allow CGB to offer below-market financing that crowds out competitive private capital.
| Provider | Interest Rate | Total Cost (20yr, $25k system) |
|---|---|---|
| CGB/IPC Smart-E Loan | 2.99% | $28,900 |
| Private Solar Installer/Market-Rate Financing | 6.99% | $33,400 |
The Distortion: CGB's rate is subsidized by ratepayer CPBC funds. A private competitor's market rate reflects true cost of capital. This is predatory pricing using public subsidies to destroy private competition.
Multifamily residential renewable energy is a fully mature, highly competitive market with abundant private capital. Nationwide developers and financiers actively compete for multifamily solar projects, offering market-rate financing without any need for public subsidy.
Private capital providers offer:
This is not a "gap" market requiring public intervention. This is a thriving competitive market that CGB has chosen to enter and dominate through predatory pricing.
CGB uses its $24-26 million annual ratepayer subsidy to offer below-market financing that private lenders—operating without subsidies—cannot match. This creates an impossible competitive dynamic:
Result: Private capital is systematically undercut and displaced—not because of inefficiency, but because CGB has unlimited ratepayer subsidies to burn.
When private capital is readily available, public subsidy serves no economic purpose. CGB's intervention in multifamily solar doesn't fill a market gap—it creates market distortion.
What CGB's multifamily financing achieves:
This is not economic development. This is bureaucratic self-preservation at ratepayer expense.
The New York Green Bank—operating under similar statutory language—takes the opposite approach:
Outcome: NYGB mobilizes $8-10 of private capital for every $1 of public funds. CGB displaces private capital, achieving the opposite of its statutory mandate.
CGB cannot compete with private capital on a level playing field. It can only "win" by flooding markets with ratepayer subsidies—squandering public funds to expand bureaucratic empires when the market no longer needs them. This is the definition of government waste and mission creep.
C-PACE Monopoly: CGB administers Connecticut's C-PACE program (Property Assessed Clean Energy), allowing it to steer commercial projects toward IPC financing.
Incentive Stacking: CGB combines CPBC grants + C-PACE loans + ITC pass-through in ways private developers can't replicate without ratepayer subsidies.
Information Asymmetry: CGB sits on both sides: regulator (setting incentive rules) AND competitor (offering IPC financing). Private developers don't know incentive structures until CGB publishes them.
Context: Town of Durham solicited bids for a 3.13 MW community solar project. Both a private solar developer and IPC (CGB affiliate) submitted proposals.
| Developer | PPA Rate | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Solar Developer 1 (Private) | $0.089/kWh | Rejected |
| IPC | $0.132/kWh | Selected |
Why IPC Won: IPC bundled CGB's "free" Solar MAP technical assistance with its bid, funded by ratepayers. The private developer couldn't compete because it didn't have access to ratepayer-funded subsidies. Result: IPC offered a rate 48% below market, made possible only through ratepayer subsidization.
Solar MAP Exclusivity: 100% of Solar MAP SCEF projects (2018-2025) financed by IPC. No exceptions. Board resolutions (2023, 2024) codified IPC's monopoly status.
Tariff Design Control: CGB/DEEP collaboratively design SCEF tariff structures, creating regulatory uncertainty that favors IPC (which has inside access to tariff negotiations).
Subscriber Acquisition: CGB uses ratepayer-funded marketing to recruit SCEF subscribers, then steers them to IPC-financed projects.
Flows to CGB
The CPBC charge is a flat per-kWh fee on all ratepayers' electric bills. Low-income households—who use less electricity and can't afford solar—subsidize wealthy homeowners and large commercial property owners who receive CGB/IPC financing.
January 2026 Rate Impact: CPBC contribution to 13% rate hike (12.64¢/kWh, up from 11.19¢/kWh previously), disproportionately harming fixed-income seniors and working families.
CGB Board of Directors votes to exempt IPC from competitive procurement requirements for Solar MAP financing. Mackey Dykes (IPC board chair) votes YES.
"IPC's mission alignment and proven track record justify sole-source designation."
— Board minutes excerptCGB announces Solar MAP Round 3 with IPC as exclusive financier. Multiple private solar developers submit formal complaint to DEEP Commissioner Katie Dykes.
"This program design categorically excludes private capital and violates CGB's statutory mandate."
— Joint letter from private solar developers (March 14, 2024)CGB Board renews IPC's sole-source status for another 2 years. No competitive RFP issued. No cost-benefit analysis conducted. Mackey Dykes again votes YES.
Investigative journalism reveals $73M in no-bid contracts to IPC since 2015. CGB spokesperson defends arrangement as "streamlining" program delivery.
Read InvestigationPolicy analysis circulates among CT legislators documenting IPC monopoly, antitrust violations, and ratepayer harm. Calls for emergency legislative action in 2025 session.
The CGB-IPC arrangement violates multiple provisions of federal antitrust law:
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992): Tying aftermarket services to equipment sales violates Sherman Act when seller has market power.
Potential Damages: Treble damages on lost profits for all excluded private solar developers across 2018-2025 period.
CGB (upstream: TA provider) forecloses downstream financing market by granting exclusive access to IPC, preventing private lenders from competing for municipal solar projects.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001): Tying operating system to web browser to foreclose Netscape violated Sherman Act.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985): Monopolist's refusal to cooperate with competitor violates § 2 when it excludes rivals from essential market access.
CGB/IPC using same playbook (bundling, predatory pricing, essential facility denial) to monopolize adjacent markets.
Connecticut cannot claim automatic immunity from antitrust liability. Under North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015), state action immunity requires:
Question: Did the Connecticut legislature clearly intend to displace competition in solar financing?
NO C.G.S. § 16-245n mandates CGB to "leverage private investment" and "foster private sector development"—the opposite of monopolization.
Question: Does a state official actively review CGB's exclusionary conduct?
NO CGB operates with minimal oversight. DEEP Commissioner approval not required for Solar MAP contracts or IPC sole-source designations.
Connecticut HAS NO antitrust immunity for CGB/IPC conduct. The state is exposed to federal antitrust enforcement (DOJ, FTC) and private treble-damage lawsuits from excluded competitors.
Connecticut is not alone in creating a Green Bank. New York established its own Green Bank in 2013 under a nearly identical statutory mandate. The difference? New York enforces accountability. Connecticut does not.
Result: State Action Immunity likely applies (NC Dental test satisfied)
Result: State Action Immunity does NOT apply (antitrust exposure)
"The NY Green Bank shall mobilize private capital and provide credit enhancements to increase clean energy deployment... without competing with private markets where capital is available."
Enforced with active PSC supervision
"The CT Green Bank shall leverage private capital and foster private sector development... to crowd in private investment in clean energy."
NOT enforced; DEEP provides no active supervision
Connecticut's law envisions the same market-catalyst model as New York. The failure is in accountability and enforcement:
Connecticut could fix this with legislative reforms requiring DEEP oversight, additionality tests, and market exit when private capital is available—exactly what New York already does.
IPC's monopoly is not inevitable. It is the product of policy choices that can be reversed through legislative action. New York proves accountability is possible.